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suggests that the forward bias documented in the literature may be less 
indicative of major market inefficiencies than previously thought.  Monte Carlo 
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1 Introduction
The uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition postulates that the expected foreign exchange gain from
holding one currency rather than another, that is the expected exchange rate change, must be just o¤set
by the opportunity cost of holding funds in this currency rather than the other, namely the interest rate
di¤erential. Assuming that there are no arbitrage opportunities and, therefore, the interest rate di¤erential
equals the forward premium, UIP then implies that the expected exchange rate change must equal the
current forward premium. In this case, the risk-neutral e¢ cient markets hypothesis holds. This condition
is routinely assumed in models of international macroeconomics and nance.
In a highly inuential paper, Fama (1984) noted that high interest rate currencies tend to appreciate,
whereas one might suppose that investors would demand higher interest rates on currencies expected to fall
in value. In turn, this result suggests that the forward premium tends to be inversely related to future
exchange rate changes, in contrast to the UIP hypothesis. This anomaly, often termed the forward bias
puzzle, continues to spur a large literature. However, regardless of the increasing sophistication of the
econometric techniques employed and of the increasing quality of the data sets utilized, researchers generally
report results which reject UIP. In fact, for the major oating currencies against the US dollar, the spot
exchange rate has usually been recorded to fall when the forward market would have predicted it to rise and
vice versa (e.g., Cumby and Obstfeld, 1984; Hodrick, 1987; Bekaert and Hodrick, 1993; Lewis, 1995; Engel,
1996; Sarno and Taylor, 2003; Sarno, 2005).
An alternative way of examining the properties of UIP is by investigating whether UIP deviationsor,
identically, foreign exchange excess returnsare predictable using the forward premium as a predictor variable.
Under the hypothesis that UIP holds (risk-neutral market e¢ ciency), excess returns must be unpredictable.
This issue was investigated, for example, by Bilson (1981), Fama (1984) and Backus et al. (1993), who
report evidence of predictability of excess returns on the basis of the lagged forward premium, inconsistent
with UIP.
Attempts to explain the forward bias puzzle using models of risk premia have met with limited and mixed
success, especially for plausible degrees of risk aversion (e.g. Frankel and Engel, 1984; Domowitz and Hakkio,
1985; Cumby, 1988; Mark, 1988; Engel, 1996). Moreover, it is di¢ cult to explain the rejection of UIP and
the forward bias puzzle by recourse either to explanations such as learning, peso problems and bubbles (e.g.
Lewis, 1995); or by recourse to consumption-based asset pricing theories which allow for departures from
time-additive preferences (Backus et al., 1993; Bansal et al., 1995; Bekaert, 1996) and from expected utility
(Bekaert et al., 1997); or else by using popular models of the term structure of interest rates adapted to a
multi-currency setting (Backus et al., 2001). Hence, even with the benet of twenty years of hindsight, the
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forward bias puzzle has not been convincingly explained and continues to ba­ e the international nance
profession.
In this paper we start from noting that prior empirical research in this area has generally relied on
linear frameworks in analyzing the properties of UIP deviations. This is surprising since several authors
have argued that the relationship between expected exchange rates and interest rate di¤erentials may be
nonlinear for a variety of reasons, including transactions costs (see, inter alia, Baldwin, 1990; Dumas, 1992;
Hollield and Uppal, 1995; Sercu and Wu, 2000), central bank intervention (e.g. Mark and Moh, 2002; Moh,
2002), and the existence of limits to speculation (e.g. Lyons, 2001, pp. 206-220). In particular, the limits
to speculation hypothesis is based on the idea that nancial institutions only take up a currency trading
strategy if this strategy is expected to yield an excess return per unit of risk (or a Sharpe ratio) that is
higher than the one implied by alternative trading strategies, such as, for example, a simple buy-and-hold
equity strategy. This argument e¤ectively denes a band of inaction where the forward bias does not attract
speculative capital and, therefore, does not imply any glaring protable opportunity and will persist until
it generates Sharpe ratios that are large enough to attract speculative capital away from alternative trading
strategies (Lyons, 2001).
Although the literature has already documented that forward premia may impact on future exchange
rates in a nonlinear fashion (e.g. Bilson, 1981; Flood and Rose, 1994; Flood and Taylor, 1996; Bansal,
1997; Huisman et al., 1998; Bansal and Dahlquist, 2000; Clarida et al., 2003, 2006; Sercu and Vandebroek,
2005), the potential importance of nonlinearities to shed light on the forward bias puzzle remains largely
under-researched. The present paper lls this gap. Our empirical framework provides a characterization
of the UIP condition which allows us to test some of the general predictions of the limits to speculation
hypothesis and to assess its potential to explain the forward bias puzzle and the excess returns predictability
documented in the literature.
Our empirical results, obtained using ve major US dollar exchange rates and considering forward rates
with 1- and 3-month maturity, are as follows. First, there is strong evidence that the relationship between
spot and forward exchange rates is characterized by signicant nonlinearities. While the detection of
nonlinearities in this context is not novel per se, our empirical model proves especially useful for understanding
the properties of deviations from UIP. In particular, consistent with the limits-to-speculation hypothesis
which we use to motivate our nonlinear spot-forward regression, we nd that, when Sharpe ratios are small,
departures from market e¢ ciency and, hence, the forward bias are statistically signicant and persistent but
economically too small to attract speculative capital, while when Sharpe ratios are large enough to attract
speculative capital the spot-forward relationship reverts rapidly towards the UIP condition.
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Second, in a battery of Monte Carlo experiments we demonstrate that, if the true data generating
process (DGP) governing the relationship between spot and forward exchange rates were of the nonlinear
form we consider in this paper, we can replicate the empirical results generally reported in the literature.
In particular, estimation of the conventional linear spot-forward regressions would lead us to reject both the
validity of UIP and the hypothesis of no predictability of foreign exchange excess returns with parameters
estimates that are close to the ones observed using actual data. However, the failure of UIP and the ndings
of a forward bias and predictability of excess returns are features that the DGP has only when expected
deviations from UIP are tiny enough to be economically unimportant and unlikely to attract speculative
capital.
Our interpretation of the empirical and Monte Carlo evidence in this paper is that the stylized fact that
the UIP condition is statistically rejected by the data is not indicative of substantial market ine¢ ciencies.
Indeed, the ine¢ ciencies implied by this rejection appear to be tiny and it is not clear, on the basis of the
evidence in this paper, that they are economically important.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an outline of the theoretical background
and introduces the limits-to-speculation hypothesis. Section 3 describes the empirical framework used to
analyze the relationship between spot and forward exchange rates. In Section 4 we report and discuss the
empirical results, while Section 5 provides the results of Monte Carlo simulations. Section 6 concludes.
Technical details on the nonlinear model employed and some robustness results are provided in Appendices
A and B respectively.
2 UIP and the Forward Bias Puzzle: A Nonlinear Perspective
2.1 The Forward Bias Puzzle
In an e¢ cient speculative market, prices should fully reect information available to market participants and
it should be impossible for a trader to earn excess returns to speculation. Under foreign exchange market
e¢ ciency and risk neutrality, UIP holds:
ks
e
t+k = it;k   it;k (1)
where st denotes the logarithm of the spot exchange rate (domestic price of foreign currency) at time t; it;k
and it;k are the nominal interest rates available on similar domestic and foreign securities respectively (with
k periods to maturity); kst+k  st+k   st; and the superscript e denotes the market expectation based on
information at time t. Testing UIP in its form as given by Equation (1) is tantamount to testing the joint
hypothesis that foreign exchange market participants are, in an aggregate sense, a) endowed with rational
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expectations and b) risk neutral.
Most often, however, empirical analyses of UIP have taken place in the context of the relationship
between spot and forward exchange rates under the assumption that covered interest parity (CIP) holds:
fkt   st = it;k   it;k, where fkt is the logarithm of the k-period forward rate (i.e. the rate agreed now for an
exchange of currencies k periods ahead). Indeed, CIP is a reasonably mild assumption, given the extensive
empirical evidence suggesting that CIP holds (Frenkel and Levich, 1975, 1977; Taylor, 1987; for a survey
of this evidence, see e.g. Sarno and Taylor, 2003, Ch. 2). Note that, unlike CIP, UIP is not an arbitrage
condition since one of the terms in the UIP equation, namely the exchange rate at time t + k, is unknown
at time t and, therefore, non-zero deviations from UIP ex ante do not necessarily imply the existence of
arbitrage prots ex post due to the foreign exchange risk associated with future exchange rate movements.
Using CIP and replacing the interest rate di¤erential it;k   it;k with the forward premium (or forward
discount) fkt   st, a number of researchers have tested UIP by estimating a regression of the form:
st+1 = + 
 
f1t   st

+ t+1; (2)
where we have assumed k = 1 for simplicity, and t+1 is a disturbance term. Under UIP,  = 0, the slope
parameter  = 1, and the disturbance term t+1 (the rational expectations forecast error under the null
hypothesis) must be uncorrelated with information available at time t (e.g. Fama, 1984).
Empirical studies based on the estimation of Equation (2), for a large variety of currencies and time
periods, generally report results which reject UIP (e.g. see the references in the survey of Hodrick, 1987;
Lewis, 1995; Taylor, 1995; Engel, 1996; Sarno, 2005). Indeed it constitutes a stylized fact that estimates of
, using exchange rates against the US dollar, are often statistically insignicantly di¤erent from zero and
generally closer to minus unity than to plus unity (Froot and Thaler, 1990). The stylized fact of a negative
 coe¢ cient in this regression implies that the more the foreign currency is at a premium in the forward
market, the less the home currency is predicted to depreciate.1 The negative value of  is the central feature
of the forward bias puzzle, and, following much previous literature, we refer to Equation (2) as the Fama
1Equivalently, via the covered interest arbitrage condition, these ndings indicate that the more domestic interest rates
exceed foreign interest rates, the more the domestic currency tends on average to appreciate over the holding period, not to
depreciate so as to o¤set on average the interest di¤erential in favor of the home currency.
5
regression.2 3
The literature has also investigated the predictability of UIP deviations (or foreign exchange excess
returns) using the forward premium as a predictor variable in a linear model obtained from reparameterizing
Equation (2) as follows:
ERt+1 = + (   1| {z }

)
 
f1t   st

+ t+1; (3)
where the excess returns ERt+1  st+1  
 
f1t   st
  st+1   f1t . This regression was investigated, for
example, by Bilson (1981), Fama (1984) and Backus et al. (1993) and was shown to generate strong pre-
dictability of excess returns (deviations from UIP) on the basis of the lagged forward premium. Specically,
while  should be zero under UIP, the evidence, consistent with a negative estimate of  in Equation (2),
is that  is negative and statistically signicantly di¤erent from zero. Clearly, given that Equation (3) is
obtained simply from reparameterizing the Fama regression (2), the forward bias puzzle arising from Equa-
tion (2) and the predictability of excess returns documented on the basis of Equation (3) must be linked,
and any explanation of the forward bias puzzle ( 6= 1) ought to be able to explain also the nding of a
non-zero value of  in Equation (3). We shall return to the link between the forward bias puzzle and the
predictability of excess returns in Section 5, where we will show that both these stylized facts can indeed be
matched using a nonlinear model of regime-dependent UIP deviations which is rationalized by the existence
of limits to foreign exchange speculation.
It is also worth noting that the framework described in this section (as well as our nonlinear framework
described later) rely on the notion that spot and forward exchange rates are cointegrated and that the
forward premium should, therefore, be stationary, in a similar fashion to Brenner and Kroner (1995) and
2Exceptions include Bansal and Dahlquist (2000), who document that the forward bias is largely conned to developed
economies and to countries for which the US interest rate exceeds foreign interest rates; Bekaert and Hodrick (2001), who,
paying particular attention to small-sample distortions of tests applied to UIP and expectations hypotheses tests, provide a
partial rehabilitationof UIP; and Flood and Rose (2002), who report that the failure of UIP is less severe during the 1990s
and for countries which have faced currency crises over the sample period investigated.
3Note that the vast majority of studies in this context estimate the Fama regression using ordinary least squares (OLS).
This can be problematic in the presence of an omitted risk premium in the regression, in which case OLS would yield biased
and inconsistent estimates of  due to a simultaneity problem (Fama, 1984; Liu and Maddala, 1992). Recently, Barnhart et
al. (1999, 2002) have shown that two conditions are needed for the simultaneity problem to arise: (i) the forward rate must
be a function of an unobservable omitted variable, such as predictable excess returns; (ii) the term containing the forward rate
in the estimated regression must be stationary or, if nonstationary, can be normalized to a stationary variable. Under these
conditions, Barnhart et al. document the severity of the simultaneity problem in a variety of spot-forward regressions.
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Clarida et al. (2003). Furthermore, another nding of the relevant literature which should be noted here
and will be recalled later as appropriate is the evidence that estimates of  display signicant time variation
across di¤erent sample periods over the recent oat. The range of estimates of  over time is large and
includes both negative and positive values (e.g. see Baillie and Bollerslev, 2000).
2.2 The Rationale for Nonlinearity in the Fama Regression
The idea that there may be nonlinearities in the spot-forward relationship is not novel. For example, the
work of Dumas (1992) on general equilibrium models of exchange rate determination in a spatially separated
world with international trade costs generated a variety of exchange rate equations where nominal exchange
rates are shown to depend nonlinearly on their fundamentals in a way that reversion towards international
parity conditions is a function of the size of the deviation from the parity conditions themselvese.g. see
Dumas (1992, p. 174, Equation 23); see also Baldwin (1990), Hollield and Uppal (1995) and Obstfeld
and Rogo¤ (2000). Sercu and Wu (2000) derive, in a partial equilibrium model, an expression for the
spot-forward relationship where, in the presence of transactions costs, expected exchange rate changes and
forward premia are imperfectly aligned, inducing nonlinearity in the spot-forward relationship. Mark and
Moh (2002) and Moh (2002) study continuous-time models where UIP is a stochastic di¤erential equation
which has a solution where the exchange rate is a nonlinear function of the interest di¤erential, modelled
according to a jump-di¤usion process regulated by occasional central bank intervention. This model records
some success in matching some of the moments in the data and is capable of shedding some light on the
forward bias puzzle when central bank intervention is not announced and takes the market by surprise.
A related, albeit di¤erent, rationalization of nonlinearity in the spot-forward relationship stems from
the limits-to-speculation hypothesis. A rich account of the implications of limits to speculation for market
e¢ ciency tests and the nonlinear behavior of deviations from UIP is provided by Lyons (2001, Ch. 7, pp.
209-220). The line of reasoning is that nancial institutions will only take up a currency trading strategy
if the strategy yields a Sharpe ratio at least equal to an alternative investment strategy, say a buy-and-hold
equity strategy. As it is well known, the Sharpe ratio is commonly dened as (E[Rs] Rf ) =s, where E[Rs]
is the expected return on the strategy, Rf is the risk-free interest rate, and s is the standard deviation of
the returns to the strategy. In essence, the Sharpe ratio may be seen as the expected excess return from
speculation per unit of risk. Given that the realized Sharpe ratio for a buy-and-hold equity strategy has
averaged about 0.4 on an annual basis for the US over the last 50 years or so4 , a buy-and-hold currency
4The average excess return (the numerator of the Sharpe ratio) is about 0.7 and the annualized standard deviation of returns
(the denominator) equals about 0.17 (see Lyons, 2001, p. 210). The gure of 0.4 is also reported by Sharpe (1994, p. 51).
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trading strategy yielding a Sharpe ratio lower than 0.4 would not be worth taking up. Although the specic
example in Lyons (2001) is based on comparisons between unconditional buy-and-hold Sharpe ratios (static
strategies) between currency and equity strategies, the same logic is applicable to comparisons between two
(or more) dynamic, conditional strategies, where one would examine conditional Sharpe ratios at a point in
time and engage in market timing activities.
Noting that, under the null hypothesis that UIP holds (i.e. foreign exchange market e¢ ciency),  = 0
and  = 1 in Equation (2) and the Sharpe ratio of currency strategies is zero, then it is only when  departs
from unity that the numerator of the Sharpe ratio takes non-zero values.5 Indeed, according to Lyons
calculations it is only when    1 or   3 that the Sharpe ratio for currency strategies is about the
same as the average from a buy-and-hold equity strategy, i.e. 0.4 (see Lyons, 2001, p. 210). This argument
e¤ectively denes a band of inaction for the forward bias such that if  1 <  < 3 nancial institutions would
have no incentive to take up the currency strategy since a buy-and-hold equity strategy would have a higher
return per unit of risk; within this band of inaction the forward bias and expected deviations from UIP are
too small to attract speculative capital and, therefore, do not imply any glaring protable opportunity.
In its essence, the limits-to-speculation argument implies that, within a certain band of  (and, conse-
quently of the Sharpe ratio), the forward bias does not attract capital and hence may potentially persist
for a long time. In some sense, this argument suggests that limits to speculation and the existence of
an opportunity cost of speculative capital create a band for the deviations from UIP where the marginal
cost of taking up a currency strategy exceeds the marginal benet.6 The crucial implication of the above
analysis is that when limits to speculation of the kind described by Lyons (2001) are taken into account,
the spot exchange rate and forward exchange rate need not move together at all times and, indeed, they
may even move in opposite directions within a bounded interval without giving rise to any glaring protable
opportunities. This argument is also consistent with the evidence that  (and hence the forward bias) is in
fact highly time-varying, inducing parameter instability in standard linear regression models which assume
a constant value of  over time (e.g. Baillie and Bollerslev, 2000). Arguments of this sort may be used to
5The numerator is just the expected foreign exchange excess return, E [st+1   (ft   st)], where (ft   st) represents a
position in foreign exchange fully hedged in the forward market, essentially taking up the equivalent role of the risk-free rate in
the context of Sharpe ratios for equity strategies. The denominator is determined by the exchange rate variances and, in the
case of multiple-exchange rates strategies, also the covariances among the exchange rates considered in the currency strategy.
6The limits to speculation hypothesis proposed by Lyons (2001) is also inspired by the limits to arbitrage theory of Shleifer
and Vishny (1997). Shleifer and Vishnys model allows for agency frictions in professional money management to lead to less
aggressive trading than in a frictionless world, so that only limited speculative capital is allocated to the trading opportunities
with the highest Sharpe ratio.
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motivate the adoption of threshold-type models of the type originally proposed by Tong (1990) to empirically
characterize the spot-forward relationship or the behavior of deviations from UIP: these threshold models
would allow for a band within which  may di¤er from unity and may be positive, zero or even negative,
while outside the band the process switches abruptly to become exactly consistent with UIP and  = 1.
Strictly speaking, assuming instantaneous allocation of speculative capital to currencies at the edges of the
band of inaction then implies that the thresholds become reecting barriers.
Nevertheless, while threshold-type models are appealing in this context, various arguments can be made
to rationalize multiple-threshold or smooth, rather than single-threshold or discrete, nonlinear adjustment in
deviations from UIP. First, the thresholds may be interpreted more broadly to reect the opportunity cost
of speculative capital, proportional transactions costs and the tendency of traders or nancial institutions to
wait for su¢ ciently large Sharpe ratios before entering the market and trading - see, for example, Soanos
(1993), Neal (1996), and Dumas (1992).
Second, one may argue that the assumption of instantaneous trade at the edges of the band of inaction
should be replaced with the presumption that it takes some time to observe a protable trading oppor-
tunity and execute transactions and that trade is infrequent (Dumas, 1992) and characterized by limited
participationdue to the fact that information costs may limit the participation of some classes of traders in
derivatives markets (e.g. Grossman and Weiss, 1983; Hirshleifer, 1988). Essentially, limited participation
models assume that agents adjust their portfolios infrequently, with a di¤erent subset of agents adjusting
in each period. Limited participation in the foreign exchange market by non-nancial corporations and
unleveraged investors7 implies that their portfolio shifts will be gradual, rather than abrupt (Lyons, 2001,
p. 218).
Third, in a market with heterogeneous agents who face di¤erent levels of position limits, agents essentially
face bands of di¤erent sizes. For relatively small deviations of  from the edges of the band of inaction, only
some traders or institutions will be able or willing to e¤ect trades. As deviations from the edges of the band
get larger, then progressively more agents will enter the market to e¤ect trades. Thus, the forces pushing
 towards the band of inaction will increase as the deviations from the edges of the band increase since
an increasing number of agents face protable opportunities. Consequently, we should observe a smooth
transition towards UIP, with the speed of reversion of the deviations from UIP towards zero increasing with
the degree of violation of the band of inaction itself (e.g. see Dumas, 1992).8
7For example, investors like mutual funds, pension funds or insurance companies, who do not have a comparative advantage
over proprietary bank traders in implementing pure currency strategies to exploit the forward bias.
8 In other words, one may be tempted to argue that, once a glaring prot opportunity is expected, the investor will invest
as much as possible to exploit it. However, this is obviously not the case in real-world nancial markets due to, among other
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Overall, the arguments discussed above suggest that limits to speculation create a band within which UIP
does not hold and where spot and forward rates may be unrelated or even move in opposite directions; further,
deviations from UIP can stray beyond the values implied by the edges of the band. Once Sharpe ratios are
large enough to attract speculative capital, deviations from UIP become increasingly mean reverting with
the size of the Sharpe ratios. Under certain restrictive conditions (including, inter alia, identical limits to
speculation and position limits, and homogeneity of agents), the reversion to UIP ( = 1) may be discrete, but
in general it is smooth, and Teräsvirta (1994) and Granger and Lee (1999) suggest that even in the former
case, time aggregation will tend to smooth the transition between regimes. Hence, smooth rather than
discrete adjustment may be appropriate in the present context, and time aggregation and nonsynchronous
adjustment by heterogeneous agents are likely to result in smooth aggregate regime switching. This is
indeed the kind of behavior we shall try to capture in our empirical framework, as discussed in the next
section. Also, note that this behavior is consistent with the evidence that spot and forward exchange rates
are cointegrated (e.g. Brenner and Kroner, 1995; Clarida et al., 2003) since the wedge between exchange
rate movements and the forward premium cannot grow to innity without agents regarding departures from
UIP as economically important and exploiting them. It is this speculative process that binds together spot
and forward rates in the long run, in the same spirit as the general arguments in Brenner and Kroner (1995).
This modelling strategy is also consistent with the evidence of parameter instability reported in Baillie and
Bollerslev (2000), providing a rationale for the result of instability of the parameter  over time: under the
working hypothesis of nonlinearity induced by limits to speculation,  is a function of time-varying Sharpe
ratios and, therefore, is expected to vary over time.
3 A Nonlinear Fama Regression
3.1 The Empirical Framework
A characterization of nonlinear adjustment in the Fama regression which allows for smooth adjustment is
in terms of a smooth transition regression (STR) model (Granger and Teräsvirta, 1993; Teräsvirta, 1994,
1998). An STR model of spot and forward rates may be written as follows:
st+1 =

1 + 1
 
f1t   st

+

2 + 2
 
f1t   st

G
h
ER
e
t ; 
i
+ "t+1; (4)
things, the existence of margin requirements and position limits. For example, Liu and Longsta¤ (2004) demonstrate that,
as an e¤ect of the existence of margin requirements, it is not optimal to take unlimited positions in arbitrage and it is often
optimal to take smaller positions in arbitrage than margin constraints would allow.
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where "t+1 is a disturbance term. The transition function G

ER
e
t ; 

determines the degree of reversion
to zero of the deviations from UIP and is itself governed by the parameter , which e¤ectively determines
the speed of reversion to UIP, and the transition variable. The transition variable is assumed to be the
expected excess return ER
e
t ; specically, ER
e
t is the deviation from UIP at time t + 1 that is expected by
market participants conditional on information available at time t. Therefore, all terms on the right hand
side of Equation (4), namely f1t   st and ER
e
t , are known at time t.
A simple transition function suggested by Granger and Teräsvirta (1993) and Teräsvirta (1994, 1998) is
the exponential function:
G
h
ER
e
t ; 
i
=
n
1 H
h
ER
e
t ; 
io
=

1  exp

 

ER
e
t
2
; (5)
in which case (4) would be termed an exponential STR or ESTR model. The exponential transition function
G is bounded between zero and unity, i.e. G : < ! [0; 1], has the properties G[0] = 0 and limx!1G[x] = 1,
and is symmetrically inversebell shaped around zero. These properties of the ESTR model are particularly
attractive in the present context because they allow a smooth transition between regimes and symmetric
adjustment of the deviations from UIP above and below the equilibrium level, consistent with the limits to
speculation hypothesis. Note also that, given the denition in Equation (5), which relates G to H linearly,
H : < ! [0; 1], has the properties H[0] = 1 and limx!1H[x] = 0, and is symmetrically bell shaped around
zero. Obviously, G = 0 when H = 1, and G = 1 when H = 0.
The transition parameter  determines the speed of transition between the two extreme regimes, with
lower absolute values of  implying slower transition. The lowerand upperregimes are dened as the
regimes corresponding to the two extreme values of the transition function, where G() = 0 and G() = 1
respectively. Investigation of the properties of the model in these two extreme regimes shed light on the
stability and dynamic properties of the STR model. The arguments in the spirit of limits to speculation
suggest the restrictions 2 =  1 and 2 = 1   1. Under these restrictions (which we test formally in
our empirical work), the lower regime corresponds to ER
e
t = 0, where G() = 0 and Equation (4) becomes a
standard linear Fama regression of the form:
st+1 =

1 + 1
 
f1t   st

+ "t+1: (6)
The upper regime corresponds, for a given , to limERet!1G

ER
e
t ; 

, where (4) becomes a di¤erent linear
Fama regression with parameters exactly consistent with UIP:
st+1 = 1 + 2 + (1 + 2)
 
f1t   st

+ "t+1
=
 
f1t   st

+ "t+1: (7)
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This formulation of the nonlinear Fama regression has several virtues. First, the model nests the
standard linear Fama regression, to which it would collapse in the absence of nonlinearity. Second, under
the restrictions 2 =  1 and 2 = 1  1, which are formally testable using standard statistical inference,
this specication captures the behavior of the deviations from UIP which is implied by the theoretical
considerations discussed in Section 2. Deviations from UIP may be persistent and consistent with the well
known forward bias when they are in the neighborhood of UIP, that is when expected excess returns are too
small to attract speculative capital. In this lower regime, UIP does not hold but departures from UIP are
economically small. However, for larger expected deviations from UIP (of either sign) that move exchange
rates towards the upper regime, nancial institutions would take up the glaring prot opportunities provided
by currency trading strategies and induce reversion towards the UIP condition.
In short, the model allows for departures from UIP at all points where the transition function G () =
1 H () 6= 1. There is only one value of the transition function and one set of parameters restrictions that
allow us conclude that UIP holds (rational expectations and risk neutrality are both valid). In essence,
the model may be seen as a characterization of the relation between spot and forward rates that allows
for departures from UIP, while yielding UIP under specic restrictions. The conditions 2 =  1 and
2 = 1   1 guarantee global stability, as exchange rates changes are moving in response to the lagged
forward premium in a way to restore UIP under those conditions. Put another way, the model is consistent
with the evidence of cointegration between spot and forward exchange rates, since the long-run tendency of
the model is the UIP condition, where st+1  
 
f1t   st

= 0. Since st+1 is stationary, and each of f1t
and st is nonstationary, the only way in which st+1  
 
f1t   st

can be stationary is if f1t and st co-move
in the long run and cointegrate with a long-run parameter of unity (e.g. Brenner and Kroner, 1995).
It is important to note that the transition function, G () is dened as a function of the conditional
expected excess return, ER
e
t . Strictly speaking, the arguments presented in Section 2.2 are in terms of
(conditional or unconditional) Sharpe ratios, which would require us to use the expected excess return
divided by the standard deviation of the excess return. We use survey data on exchange rate expectations
to construct a proxy for the conditional expected excess return. As described in the data section below,
survey data to proxy a conditional standard deviation are not available. Consequently, in the empirical
work, we standardize the excess return by its unconditional standard deviation (see Section 4.2). This proxy
is, however, imperfect in that the Sharpe ratio is calculated using the conditional expected excess return in
the numerator and the unconditional standard deviation in the denominator. We shall test for robustness of
our core results using an alternative proxy for the risk factor in the denominator of the Sharpe ratio, namely
the implied volatility from currency options.
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We note that, if the true DGP of the spot-forward relationship is indeed nonlinear of the form (4), then
, as given in Equation (2), will lie in the interval between 1 and (1 + 2) = 1. It seems plausible that if
the distribution of UIP deviations is consistent with the majority of observations being in the lower regime
(where  may be negative and the forward bias is expected to be persistent), one may well nd negative
values of  from estimating the linear Fama regression (2). We shall investigate exactly this issue in Section
5 using Monte Carlo methods.
It is also instructive to reparameterize the nonlinear Fama regression (4) in terms of deviations from UIP
by subtracting the forward premium,
 
f1t   st

from both sides of Equation (4) as follows:
ERt+1 =
2641 + (1   1)| {z }

 
f1t   st
375+ 2 + 2  f1t   stG hERet ; i+ "t+1: (8)
The discussion on the e¤ects of limits to speculation in the previous section suggests that the larger the
expected deviation from UIP the larger the e¤ect of speculative forces in generating reversion towards UIP.
This implies that while  < 0 is admissible in Equation (8), one must have 2 > 0 and 
 + 2 = 0 for the
forward premium to have no predictive power on future excess returns in the upper regime.
Note that Equation (8) may be seen as the nonlinear analogue of (and indeed nests) the predictability
regression (3), exactly like Equation (4) is the nonlinear analogue of the Fama regression (2). Hence,
Equation (8) also has implications for conventional tests of predictability of excess returns using the forward
premium as a predictor variable based on a linear model obtained from reparameterizing the Fama regression
(2). Clearly, if the true DGP of UIP deviations is indeed nonlinear of the form (4) (or (8)), then  as
given in Equation (3) will lie in the interval between  and ( + 2) = 0. Whether 
 is closer to 
or to ( + 2) will depend on the distribution of UIP deviations, but it seems at least possible that if the
distribution of UIP deviations is consistent with the majority of observations being in the lower regime one
may nd negative and statistically signicant estimates of  from estimating Equation (3). Again, we shall
investigate this issue in Section 5 using Monte Carlo methods.
It is worth noting that Granger and Teräsvirta (1993) and Teräsvirta (1994) also suggest the logistic
function as a plausible transition function for some applications, resulting in a logistic STR (LSTR) model,
which implies asymmetric behavior of the deviations from UIP according to whether they are positive or
negative, which could potentially arise in the context of this paper due to, for example, short-sale restrictions.
Hence, we do test for nonlinearities arising from the LSTR formulation as a test of specication of the
estimated models in the section discussing the empirical analysis. Also, as a preliminary to our estimation
of a nonlinear Fama regression, we evaluate the adequateness of the linear Fama regression by performing
tests of linearity against nonlinearity of smooth-transition type (for both ESTR and LSTR formulations)
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and by testing the hypothesis of symmetry directly.
However, we wish to emphasize that, while our empirical analysis is inspired by the limits to speculation
hypothesis, we do not claim to provide a direct test of this specic hypothesis, but rather a test of its
general predictions for the relationship between spot and forward exchange rates. Our approach is best
interpreted as an empirical characterization of the spot-forward relationship motivated by the limits to
speculation hypothesis or simply as an empirical investigation of parsimonious models of foreign exchange
excess returns. In particular, although we have focused on a specic nonlinear formulation of the relationship
between exchange rates and forward premia capable of capturing some of the key predictions of the limits
to speculation hypothesis, we cannot discard the possibility that the source of nonlinearities we document
below is a factor other than limits to speculation.
3.2 The Solution of the Model When the Market Expectation Equals the Math-
ematical Expectation
In this sub-section, we further clarify the properties of the model and the treatment of market (subjec-
tive) expectations and mathematical expectations. Taking expectations of Equation (8) and dening the
mathematical expectation conditional on information at time t as Et (yt+1) = ymt yields
ERmt =

1 + (1   1)
 
f1t   st

+

2 + 2
 
f1t   st

G
h
ER
e
t ; 
i
: (9)
Then, noting that the market expectation needs not be equal to the mathematical expectation, we can dene
ERet = ER
m
t + t (10)
with t = 0 if rational expectations hold. Substituting (10) into (9) gives
ERmt =

1 + (1   1)
 
f1t   st

+

2 + 2
 
f1t   st

G [ERmt + t; ] : (11)
We can now formally derive the conditions under which there is a unique solution for ERet in this model.
To this end let us impose the conditions under which the theoretical implications of the limits to speculation
hypothesis holds, i.e. 2 =  1 and 2 = 1   1, and that expectations are formed rationally, i.e. ERet =
ERmt and t = 0. Equation (12) then becomes:
ERmt =

1 + (1   1)
 
f1t   st

H [ERmt ; ] (12)
where H [ERmt ; ] = 1 G [ERmt ; ] = exp
h
   ERmt 2i.
Building on the results of Peel and Venetis (2005), the solution with respect to ERmt is as follows
ERmt = exp
n
 0:5W
h
2

1 + (1   1)
 
f1t   st
2io 
1 + (1   1)
 
f1t   st

(13)
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where W (x) is the Lambert W function (also called Omega function), dened implicitly as the solution of
W (x)eW (x) = x; see Appendix A for a derivation of this equation. The solution captures the expectations-
consistent process and embodies the notion that expectations are a monotonic function of the current forward
premium,
 
f1t   st

. The expectations-consistent process implies that adjustment to UIP is faster the greater
the expected deviation from UIP; essentially, on the basis of information on the forward premium,
 
f1t   st

as well as the parameters 1 and (1   1), agents form expectations of UIP deviations next period, which
may be seen as underlying a carry-trade type strategy of the kind commonly followed by foreign exchange
speculators. Speculative forces would therefore be increasing in the current forward bias, related to the
expected deviation from UIP according to Equation (13), which is the underlying rationale of the arguments
described in Section 2.2see also the discussion in Peel and Venetis (2005) on arbitrage and expectations
consistency in the context of arbitrage in international goods markets and purchasing power parity.
The Lambert W function does not admit a closed-form expression, so it would have to be approximated
in empirical modelling if one wants to take to the data Equation (13) (see Corless et al., 1996, and the
references therein). However, this is not a problem in the context of this paper since in our empirical model
we employ survey data on exchange rate expectations to proxy the transition variable, ERet . As discussed
later, these expectations data are well known to be correlated with the forward premium, a fact that is
consistent with the above theoretical result that expectations of UIP deviations are a monotonic function of
current departures from UIP.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Data, Summary Statistics and the Fama Regression
Our data set comprises weekly observations of spot and 4- and 13-week (or 1- and 3-month) forward US
dollar exchange rates against the Japanese yen, the UK sterling, the German mark, the euro, and the Swiss
franc. Due to data availability considerations and to the advent of the euro on January 1 1999, the sample
period spans from January 4 1985 to December 31 2002 for all exchange rates except for the German mark
(January 7 1986 to December 31 1998) and the euro (January 5 1999 to December 31 2002). Following
previous literature (e.g. Hansen and Hodrick, 1980, p. 852), data are Tuesdays of every week, taken from
Datastream. To keep the notation simple, a 4-week change in a variable is stated as a change from t to
t + 1, and f jt is the forward rate for a contract with j months (or j months to maturity). From this data
set, we constructed the time series of interest, namely the logarithm of the spot exchange rate, st and the
logarithm of the 1- and 3-month forward exchange rates, f1t and f
3
t respectively, both at the weekly and
monthly frequency. The core of the empirical work is based on st and f1t at the weekly frequency, whereas
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we use the weekly f3t as well as monthly data for st, f
1
t and f
3
t in our robustness analysis.
In order to construct a proxy for the expected excess return, ER
e
t , we use survey data on exchange
rate expectations from Money Market Services (MMS). The MMS reports the median forecasts of survey
respondents. The survey provides data on a weekly basis for both one-month and three-month ahead
expectations of the dollar exchange rates examined. Participants to the survey include exchange rate
dealers, banking and corporate economists, as well as market economists. Because the MMS reports the
median forecasts, this measure masks individual heterogeneity. However, to analyze issues related to market
e¢ ciency of the kind studied in this paper one has to resort to an aggregate expectation of the exchange
rate and, therefore, the MMS measure seems appropriate. Unfortunately, MMS does not report a measure
of dispersion of the MMS forecasts nor does it report data on forecasts of the exchange rate volatility. This
prevents us from constructing the ideal Sharpe ratio we would wish to have, namely the conditional expected
excess return divided by the conditional expected standard deviation. Essentially MMS only provides us
with the numerator of the Sharpe ratio, which we shall standardize by dividing it by the unconditional
standard deviation in the core results and by the conditional implied volatility in our robustness checks.
The advantage of using the MMS forecasts is that the properties of these exchange rate expectations
are well documented in the literature (e.g. see the references in Takagi, 1991; Osterberg, 2000; Sarno and
Taylor, 2001). Specically, expected changes in exchange rates have been found to have a tendency to
underpredict actual exchange rate movements, implying that part of the actual exchange rate changes are
unexpected. The evidence also suggests that unbiasednessthe notion that survey measures are unbiased
forecasts of actual future outcomesis rejected in time series evidence, but is not rejected in cross-sectional
evidence (e.g. Chinn and Frankel, 2002). Another feature of some importance in relating survey measures
to the rational expectations hypothesis is that MMS forecasts are not consistent with the orthogonality
hypothesis, implying that survey data do not fully incorporate all available information, in contrast with the
rational expectations paradigm (see Takagi, 1991; Osterberg, 2000). Finally, exchange rate expectations are
correlated with the forward premium, suggesting that at least some of the variation in the forward premium
is due to expected depreciationor, in other words, the variation in the forward premium cannot be solely
due to risk premia (Chinn and Frankel, 2002).9
In Table 1, we report sample moments for several combinations of weekly spot and 1-month forward
9However, we should note that all of these properties are based on empirical evidence that originates from the assumption
of linearity. If nonlinearity and regime dependence characterize the unknown true DGP linking exchange rate expectations to
risk premia and forward premia, then this a¤ects the reliability of standard measures of correlations as well as unbiasedness
and orthogonality tests based on linear regressions (see Granger and Teräsvirta, 1993).
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exchange rates, including the forward premium f1t   st (Panel A), the depreciation rate st+1  st (Panel B),
and the excess return st+1   f1t (Panel C). The summary statistics conrm the stylized facts that each of
f1t  st, st+1 st and st+1 f1t have a mean close to zero with a large standard deviation. However, while the
rst-order autocorrelation coe¢ cient of the depreciation rate is very small in size (never higher than 0.09)
and generally statistically insignicantly di¤erent from zero, the rst-order autocorrelation coe¢ cient of the
forward premium is generally large (in the range between 0.439 for Germany and 0.761 for the UK) and
statistically signicantly di¤erent from zero, and the corresponding rst-order autocorrelation coe¢ cient
of the excess return is small (in the range between 0.053 for Germany and 0.131 for the euro) but often
statistically signicant. These results are consistent with the stylized facts that the forward premium is a
highly persistent process, and the depreciation rate shows weak serial correlation (or the exchange rate is a
near random walk process).10
As a preliminary exercise, we estimated the conventional Fama regression (2) for each exchange rate
examined. The results, reported in Table 2, are consistent with the existence of forward bias in that,
while the constant term  is very close to zero and often statistically insignicant,  is estimated to be
negative for all but one of the exchange rate regressions estimated and it is often statistically insignicantly
di¤erent from zero. The only exception is Germany, where the estimate of  is positive (about 0.32) and
statistically signicant, but this estimate does not comprise the theoretical value of unity that is implied
by UIP when examining the standard errors. In the last column of Table 2 we also report the t-statistics
for the signicance of the parameter associated with the forward premium - namely  - in a predictability
regression of the form (3). Consistent with a large literature (e.g. Fama, 1984; Backus et al., 1993), we nd
that, for each exchange rate,  is statistically signicantly di¤erent from zero, indicating a departure from
market e¢ ciency (under which  = 0) and that the forward premium, which is an element of the market
participantsinformation set, can be used to predict foreign exchange excess returns.
10Asymptotic standard errors were calculated using an autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity consistent matrix of residuals
throughout the paper (Newey and West, 1987). We also tested for unit root behavior of the spot rate and the forward rate
time series examined by calculating several unit root test statistics. We were in each case unable to reject the unit root null
hypothesis for spot and forward exchange rates, whereas the forward premium was found to be stationary at conventional
nominal levels of signicance. On the other hand, di¤erencing the spot and forward exchange rate time series did appear to
induce stationarity in each case. Hence, the unit root tests (not reported but available from the authors upon request) clearly
indicate that each of the spot and forward rates time series examined is a realization from a stochastic process integrated
of order one, whereas the forward premium is stationary, consistent with the evidence that spot and forward exchange rates
cointegrate (Brenner and Kroner, 1995).
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4.2 The Nonlinear Fama Regression
In order to evaluate the validity of the assumption of linearity in the conventional Fama regressions reported
in Table 2, we performed tests of linearity against the alternative of smooth transition nonlinearity, using
the expected annualized excess return, ER
e
t as the transition variable. We followed the Teräsvirta (1994,
1998) decision rule to select the most adequate transition function for modelling nonlinearity in the present
context. This is a testing procedure designed to test the hypothesis of linearity and to select the most
adequate nonlinear function between a logistic and an exponential function. As shown by the results in
Table 3, the general linearity test FL strongly rejects the null hypothesis of linearity. Employing the
Teräsvirta rule to discriminate between exponential and logistic formulations led us to conclude that an
exponential function (ESTR model) is the most adequate parametric formulation (given that F2 yields the
lowest p-value). This nding is consistent with our priors and the limits-to-speculation hypothesis, discussed
in Section 2.
Given the results from the linearity tests, we estimate the nonlinear Fama regression (4) by nonlinear least
squares under the restrictions 2 =  1 and 2 = 1 1 (which we test formally below). In estimation, we
followed the recommendation of Granger and Teräsvirta (1993) and Teräsvirta (1994, 1998) of standardizing
the transition variable ER
e
t by dividing it by the sample standard deviation of the transition variable,bERe , and using a starting value of unity for the estimation algorithm. Also, since this standardization
applies to the transition variable, which now becomes
 
ER
e
t

=bERe , the transition variable has a natural
interpretation in terms of annualized Sharpe ratio, which tightens the link between the empirical framework
and the limits-to-speculation hypothesis.
The results, reported in Panel A of Table 4, indicate that the Fama regression is indeed highly nonlinear.
The estimated transition parameter appears to be signicantly di¤erent from zero, in each equation, both on
the basis of the individual asymptotic standard errors as well as on the basis of the Skalins (1998) parametric
bootstrap likelihood ratio test (see the p-values in square brackets in the last column of Panel A of Table
4).11 The estimates of the slope parameters 1 and 2 are correctly signed according to our priors based
on the limits to speculation hypothesis, namely we nd a negative estimated value of 1 and a large positive
value of 2 such that UIP holds exactly when the transition function G () = 1. The only exception is
Germany, where we record a positively signed estimate of 1 equal to about 0.15, which seems reasonable
given that in estimation of the linear Fama regression we found that Germany was the only country for which
a statistically signicant positive value of  was found.12 In turn, these values imply that, for small Sharpe
11Because the Skalin test of the null hypothesis that  = 0 in the transition function may also be construed as a test of
nonlinearity, these results conrm the presence of nonlinearity in the Fama regression for each exchange rate examined.
12The standard errors and test statistics in Table 4 are calculated using an autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity consistent
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ratios (the transition variable), UIP does not hold and we observe a forward bias, while for increasingly
large Sharpe ratios (which are likely to attract speculative capital), reversion to UIP can occur rapidly.
These ndings also imply that, since reversion to UIP occurs rapidly for large Sharpe ratios, the bulk of the
observations of the deviations from UIP is in the lower regime, potentially generating substantial persistence
in the forward bias, as predicted by the limits to speculation hypothesis. We shall return to the analysis of
the distribution of deviations from UIP in Section 5.
The estimated transition parameters also imply well-dened transition functions, as shown in Figure 1,
which displays the plots of the estimated transition functions, G (), against the annualized Sharpe ratio
ERet=ER for each exchange rate. The speed of the transition functions is made clear by the evidence that
the limiting case of G () = 1 is attained for each exchange rate except the euro, which is impressive given
that we are dealing with weekly data. The transition functions also conrm how most of the observations
of the deviations from UIP are close to zero, i.e. in the lower regime.13
A battery of diagnostic tests is reported in Panel B of Table 4. We report a likelihood ratio test (LR1) for
the null hypothesis of no asymmetric response of exchange rate changes to positive and negative values of the
forward premium. This test, which was calculated using an asymmetric generalization of the nonlinear Fama
regression reported in Panel A of Table 4, may be interpreted as a further test of the adequateness of the
chosen nonlinear model and of its ability to account for the nonlinearity in the data. For each exchange rate,
we are unable to reject the hypothesis of no asymmetry in the STR model, therefore justifying the estimation
of an STR model that imposes symmetric adjustment, as given by Equations (4)-(5). Using a likelihood
ratio (LR2) test for the null hypothesis that 2 =  1 and 2 = 1   1, reported in the second column,
we could not reject the validity of these restrictions at the ve percent signicance level. As discussed in
Section 2.2, these restrictions imply an equilibrium log-level in the model which is exactly consistent with
deviations from UIP being equal to zero. For each of the estimated nonlinear Fama regressions, we then
tested the null hypothesis of no remaining nonlinearity (FNRN ), constructed as in Eithreim and Teräsvirtas
(1996) and reported in the third column of Panel B. The null hypothesis of no remaining nonlinearity
could not be rejected for any of the estimated models, indicating that our parsimonious generalization of the
matrix of residuals (Newey and West, 1987), since the overlap of the weekly sampling induces moving average terms in the
residuals of order 3 for regressions based on a 1-month forward rateand 12 for regressions based on a 3 -month (13-weeks)
forward rate, reported in the robustness section below.
13Note that the Sharpe ratios on the horizontal axis are positive on both sides of the mid-point, zero, to reect the possibility
of taking long or short positions in the foreign exchange market. Specically, if the agent believes that the forward rate
undervalues (overvalues) the dollar, that agent will take a long (short) position forward, resulting in positive excess returns.
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Fama regression appears to capture satisfactorily the nonlinearity in the spot-forward relationship.14 We
also tested for the stability of the model by constructing the appropriate test proposed by Eithreim and
Teräsvirtas (1996) for each nonlinear model. This is a test for the hypothesis of no structural break in the
parameters (FNSB) specically designed for smooth transition models. The results, reported in the last
column of Panel B, suggest no structural break in the parameters of the model, with p-values reasonably
larger than the conventional ve percent.
Overall, the nonlinear estimation results uncover strong evidence of nonlinearities in the relationship
between spot and forward exchange rates, with UIP deviations adjusting towards their zero equilibrium level
at a speed which depends upon the size of the Sharpe ratio. The estimated models are in each case consistent
with the priors established by the limits to speculation arguments made in Section 2.2. The bottom line
is that our model is consistent with the forward bias characterizing only small departures from UIP. It is
worth emphasizing, however, that this model does not imply that UIP holds all the time. On the contrary,
given the persistence of the forward bias in the lower regime, UIP does not hold most of the time. The
model implies that UIP does not hold when expected departures from UIP are economically small enough to
be ignored by investors who are not willing or able to trade for such excess returns. If this is the case, then
one may argue that the rejections of UIP routinely recorded in the literature are indeed primarily statistical,
rather than economic, rejections of the theoretical link between exchange rates and interest rates (or forward
rates). Before turning to a ner interpretation of our results, we discuss some robustness exercises.
4.3 Robustness Checks
In this section we report several robustness checks carried out in order to evaluate the sensitivity of the
empirical results reported in the previous sections. In particular, we assessed the robustness of our results
to the choice of the maturity of the forward contract and to the choice of the frequency of the data. The
results are reported in Appendix B. We re-estimated the nonlinear Fama regression (4) for each exchange
rate examined using a 3-month forward contract at the weekly frequency (see Panel A of Table B1) to assess
the robustness to the choice of the forward contract maturity and then using a 1-month forward contract at
the monthly frequency (see Panel B of Table B1) to assess the robustness to the frequency of the data. The
results reported in Table A1 show that, in each case, the estimates obtained are qualitatively similar to the
results reported in Table 4 for a 1-month forward contract at the weekly frequency. For the monthly data
14To shed further light on the properties of the model, one can employ the numerical skeletonprocedure typically suggested
in this context (e.g. Teräsvirta and Anderson, 1992; Teräsvirta, 1998; Franses and van Dijk, 2000; see also De Grauwe and
Grimaldi, 2005). Results on the implementation of this procedure are available upon request.
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(Panel B of Table B1), the estimates of the slope parameters and the transition parameters are larger than
for weekly data, as one would expect. However, the sign of the parameters is consistent with the results in
Table 4, and their statistical signicance and the evidence of nonlinearity are strong.
Another check of the robustness of our core results relates to the denition of the transition variable in
the model. As noted earlier, the transition function depends on the conditional expected excess return, ER
e
t
standardized by the unconditional standard deviation, ER. One would ideally wish to have a conditional
Sharpe ratio (conditional expectedexcess return divided by the conditional standard deviation of the excess
return). Our proxy is, however, imperfect in that the Sharpe ratio is calculated with a conditional term
on the numerator and an unconditional term on the denominator. This is because survey data to proxy
a conditional standard deviation are not available. We test for robustness of our core results using an
alternative proxy for the risk factor in the denominator of the conditional Sharpe ratio, namely the implied
volatility from currency options.15 The resulting proxy for annualized Sharpe ratios is now conditional
(both in terms of the numerator, the expected excess return, and the denominator, the square root of
implied volatility). However, it is still imperfect in some sense because the numerator is an expectation
coming from survey data, whereas the denominator is implied by market prices under the specic assumption
that the Black-Scholes model applies to currency options. Nevertheless, this setting helps us to provide
further evidence on the robustness of our core results.
Using this alternative proxy for the transition variable, we re-estimated the STR model for all ve
exchange rates examined and found that the restrictions implied by the limits to speculation hypothesis hold
in each case. We also obtained convergence for each exchange rate model and parameter estimates that are
similar to the ones reported in Table 4. In general, therefore, the use of this alternative, fully conditional
proxy for the Sharpe ratio in the transition function of the STR model delivers results that are consistent
with the core results in Table 4.16
We also addressed thoroughly the robustness of our linearity tests results. The main concern involves
the possibility of a spurious rejection of the linearity hypothesis when the test statistics FL, F3, F2, and F1
are applied to the Fama regression (2) in nite samples. We addressed this issue by executing a battery
of Monte Carlo experiments, constructed using 5; 000 replications in each experiment and with identical
random numbers across experiments. The aim of the experiments is to evaluate the empirical size and power
properties of these tests and to gauge the extent to which one would reject the linear Fama regression when
15Weekly data on implied volatility were obtained for the sample period from 3 January 1986 to 31 December 2002 from the
Philadelphia Exchange (PHLX), the main currency options exchange in the US according to the 2004 Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) Survey on Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity.
16These results are not reported to conserve space since they resemble closely the results in Table 4.
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in fact that was the true DGP (empirical size) and the extent to which the tests would detect nonlinearity
when in fact the true DGP is a nonlinear Fama regression (empirical power). In setting up the DGP for
each of the linear and nonlinear Fama regressions, we calibrated the DGP on our results for the dollar-yen
exactly as reported in Table 2 for the linear Fama regression and in Table 4 for the nonlinear ESTR Fama
regression. Given that our actual sample comprises 940 data points in total, we carried out the simulations
for sample sizes of 470 (half of the actual sample) and 940 (the actual sample size) articial data points.
Our simulations resultsreported in Table B2 for each of the 10, 5 and 1 percent signicance levelsindicate
satisfactory empirical size and power properties for each of the test statistics FL, F3, F2, and F1. In terms
of empirical size, none of the test statistics displays evidence of substantial size distortion at any of the
three signicance levels considered. In terms of empirical power, the general linearity test FL rejects about
73 (66) percent of the times with 940 (470) observations at the 5 percent signicance level when the true
DGP is nonlinear. This is not the theoretical level of 95 percent but it is high enough to judge the test as
satisfactory. The test statistics F3, F2, and F1 are less powerful than FL but they appear to be satisfactory
in discriminating between exponential (ESTR) and logistic (LSTR) specications, as evidenced by the much
higher power of F2 (linearity versus ESTR) relative to F3 and F1 (linearity versus LSTR).17
The main result arising from these simulations for our purposes is that it seems unlikely, in light of the
documented size and power properties, that we are detecting spurious nonlinearities in this paper since we
nd no tendency of the linearity tests employed to over-reject the null hypothesis of linearity when the true
DGP is a linear Fama regression.
4.4 Interpreting the Empirical Results
Our empirical results provide clear evidence that the relationship between spot and forward exchange rates
is characterized by important nonlinearities. While this result is not novel per se, we considered a nonlinear
model which may be viewed as a generalization of the conventional Fama spot-forward regression and which
therefore may be used to understand the properties of deviations from UIP. Our nonlinear spot-forward
regression was rationalized on the basis of the argument that the existence of limits to foreign exchange
speculation can allow deviations from UIP to be both persistent and consistent with the well known forward
17Another check we carried out relates to the robustness of our choice of the exponential function over the sample. Specically,
we carried out the linearity tests in two di¤erent sub-samples for the three exchange rates for which we have a longer full sample
Japanese yen, UK sterling and Swiss franc. Splitting the sample in two sub-samples at the end of 1993, we found that for
each sub-sample the linearity tests conrm the choice of an exponential smooth transition model, corroborating our full sample
results. These test results are available upon request.
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bias within a certain range (e.g. Lyons, 2001). According to the limits-to-speculation hypothesis, for small
Sharpe ratios the forward bias does not attract speculative capital, which can be more protably invested
in alternative investment opportunities for the same level of risk. However, as Sharpe ratios become larger,
agents take up positions in currency trading strategies, which induce the spot-forward relationship to revert
exactly to UIP. Our nonlinear model parsimoniously captures this behavior and our estimation results
uncover robust evidence that ve major spot and forward dollar exchange rates have behaved in this fashion
over the 1985-2002 sample period.
One aspect of the rationale behind this model is, therefore, that nancial institutions decide to allocate
capital on the basis of Sharpe ratios and that this process induces the nonlinear dynamics we observe in
the data. In Table 5, we report the average annualized Sharpe ratios (rst column), for each exchange
rate examined, calculated as the average realized standardized excess returns over the sample period. The
Sharpe ratios range from 0.14 for the Japanese yen to 0.88 for the UK sterling. It is interesting how the
average Sharpe ratio across the ve dollar exchange rates examined is 0.48, the value reported by Lyons
(2001, p. 214) as the Sharpe ratio obtaining from employing a currency strategy (with equal weights) on the
six most liquid currencies.
Given that the transition function we estimate is bounded between zero and unity and may be viewed as
the probability of being in one of the two extreme regimes (one regime with persistent but tiny deviations
from UIP, and another regime where UIP holds), it is instructive to graph the estimated transition functions
over time. In Figure 2, we plot the estimated transition function for each exchange rate, over the sample.
The plots make clear how the model implies that the spot-forward regressions (or the deviations from UIP)
are in the lower regime (dened, for simplicity, as the case where G()  0:5) most of the time. The
lower regime is the one characterized by a very persistent forward bias, which, however, is associated with
low and economically unimportant Sharpe ratios. In some sense, therefore, these ndings suggest that the
forward bias does characterize the majority of the observations in the data, but only those observations where
nancial institutionsspeculative capital is unlikely to be attracted by currency trading strategies because
the size of the ine¢ ciency is relatively low. On the other hand, although fewer observations are in the upper
regime (say when G() > 0:5), in this regime deviations from UIP are characterized by low persistence,
suggesting that speculative forces induce fast reversion to UIP. Interestingly, therefore, rejections of UIP in
a linear framework can be explained by the dominance of the observations for which UIP does not hold in
the data (the lower regime), but our analysis reveals that these observations are characterized by small and
economically unimportant departures from UIP. Put another way, the statistical rejections of UIP typically
recorded in the relevant literature may indicate that exchange rates have on average been relatively close to
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UIP, rather than implying that UIP and foreign exchange market e¢ ciency are strongly violated.18 19
It is instructive to calculate the size of the annualized Sharpe ratio such that transition function G () =
0:5, which we term the minimum Sharpe ratio (min SR) such that one may be in the upper regime.20 The
calculations are given, for each exchange rate, in the middle column of Table 5. Clearly, while 0.4 (the value
that Lyons suggests conservatively as a minimum Sharpe ratio necessary to attract speculative capital) is not
su¢ cient to induce the shift to the upper regime, the range of the minimum level required goes from about
1.14 for Germany to about 2.46 for the euro. Indeed, this evidence seems consistent with the argument
made by Lyons (2001, p. 215), on the basis of interviews with several proprietary traders and desk managers,
that restoration of the UIP equilibrium condition through allocation of speculative capital is likely to require
an extremely large amount of order ow and that these large amounts generally occur when traders or desk
managers are facing Sharpe ratios of at least unity. These Sharpe ratios can hardly be achieved through
bias trading in a one-exchange-rate setting of the type considered here, as illustrated in the last column of
Table 5, which reports that some 68 to 97 percent of the observations are below the minimum Sharpe ratios
we calculate. While it may be possible to achieve Sharpe ratios of this magnitude, this happens rarely in a
one-exchange-rate setting. These Sharpe ratios are likely to require much more sophisticated multi-currency
portfolio strategies based on currency overlay programs. If any Sharpe ratio below the minimum Sharpe
ratio we calculate is consistent with the forward bias being too small to attract speculative capital, then one
would expect that most of the time deviations from UIP are indeed characterized by forward bias.
An important caveat is, however, that, while our empirical analysis is inspired by the limits to speculation
hypothesis, we do not claim to be able to provide a direct test of this specic hypothesis, but rather a test of
its general predictions for the nonlinear linkages between spot and forward exchange rates. Our approach
enables us to capture some of the key predictions of the limits to speculation hypothesis, but the nonlinearity
18Note that the simplifying assumption that G() > 0:5 is indicative of being in the upper regime is quite mild. In fact, as
noted by a referee, given our estimates of  in Table 4, deviations from UIP can still be quite substantial when G() = 0:5. This
means that assuming G() > 0:5 (rather than requiring a value larger than 0:5) is su¢ cient to move to the upper regime will
lead to a conservative estimate of the importance of limits to speculation. In other words, assuming that UIP deviations only
become economically small for higher values of G() would further reinforce our point that the majority of the observations in
the data are in the lower regime.
19Also, note that these transition functions imply that the parameter linking future exchange rate changes to the current
forward premium, which depends on the transition function, displays a lot of variation over time, as one would expect under
the limits-to-speculation hypothesis and as documented in other research focusing on the instability of the parameter  in the
Fama regression (e.g. Baillie and Bollerslev, 2000).
20Given b reported in Table 4, this is simply the value of SR that solves 1  exp  SR2	 = 0:5.
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recorded in our research may be due to factors other than or in addition to limits to speculation. It is possible
to rationalize nonlinearities, for example, on the basis of arguments based on discrete intervention of central
banks (e.g. Mark and Moh, 2002), general equilibrium models of exchange rate determination in segmented
international capital markets and international trade costs (e.g. Dumas, 1992; Hollield and Uppal, 1995;
Obstfeld and Rogo¤, 2000), and other standard transactions-costs arguments (e.g. Sercu and Wu, 2000).
We leave to future research the design of a framework where researchers can formally discriminate among
di¤erent theories or frictions that predict the existence of nonlinearities on spot-forward regressions.
4.5 Forecasting
The primary purpose of this paper is to improve our understanding of the behavior of UIP deviations and
the relationship between spot and forward exchange rates and to test theoretical predictions that such
a relationship should be nonlinear. However, the nonlinear empirical models examined can be used as
predictive models for the returns from currency speculation to shed further light on their ability to explain
exchange rate movements over time and their performance relative to the standard linear Fama regression.
Given that the selected nonlinear models t better than their linear counterparts, it may be possible to build
a better trading strategy than is available using the standard Fama regression model.
We evaluate predictive performance in two ways. First, we report evidence using the projectionstatistic
recently suggested by Evans and Lyons (2005). This test statistic has a known asymptotic distribution
under the null hypothesis that the spot exchange rate follows a random walk. The results are obtained
using recursive estimates of the linear and nonlinear models using a growing number of observations. The
statistic is calculated by estimating the parameter  in the regression: dst+1jt = 0+st+1+t+1, where the
hat denotes the one-step-ahead (one-week-ahead) prediction from the (linear or nonlinear) Fama regression
see Evans and Lyons (2005) for further details on the properties of this test. We compute standard errors
for  using the Newey-West autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity consistent correction. Under the null
hypothesis that st follows a random walk st+1jt = 0 and  = 0. The results, reported in Table 6, indicate
that using the predictions from the linear Fama regression yields a correctly signed estimate of  (positive).
However, the estimates of  are statistically insignicantly di¤erent from zero (except for the German mark).
Using the predictions from the nonlinear Fama regression model gives larger estimates of , which are also
statistically signicantly di¤erent from zero for three out of ve exchange rates. Bearing in mind that these
are weekly predictions of exchange rate changes, which are well known to contain a large unforecastable
component, the estimates of  obtained using predictions from the nonlinear models compare well to the
estimates reported in the work of Evans and Lyons (2005), even though the information used here only
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includes publicly available information.
Second, we calculate unconditional annualized Sharpe ratios corresponding to each R
2
for both the linear
and nonlinear Fama regressions. The annualized Sharpe ratios are calculated as: SR =
q
0:42 +R
2
=
q
1 R2,
following Cochrane (1999, pp. 65-66 and pp. 75-76) and Gallant et al. (1990). The value chosen to proxy
for the unconditional annualized Sharpe ratio of a US buy-and-hold strategy is 0.4 (the rst term in the
square root in the numerator), following Sharpe (1994) and Lyons (2001). The derivation of this formula
for the Sharpe ratio stems from the implementation of a simple market timing strategy based on a general
predictability model (Cochrane, 1999, p. 65-66).21 The results, reported in Table 7 show a clear di¤erence
between the linear and nonlinear Fama regression. While the linear regression delivers an R
2
in the range
from 0.2% to 7%, the nonlinear regression provides us with a R
2
ranging from 3.7% to about 17%. These
values of the R
2
imply Sharpe ratios for the nonlinear model ranging from 0.45 to about 0.63. These Sharpe
ratios appear respectable if one considers that the underlying strategy is a pure currency strategy only in-
volving two currencies (one exchange rate). In practice, however, nancial institutions typically engage in
multi-currency forward bias strategies involving more than two currencies. Hence, assuming that banks use
more sophisticated strategies than the one discussed here, and hence might achieve higher Sharpe ratios than
the ones we record on one-exchange-rate strategies, would further support our interpretation of the results
in this section.
As noted by an anonymous referee, Deutsche Bank frequently reports Sharpe ratios close to 0.9 for a
simple multi-currency strategy. In practice, speculative capital is often attracted by (relatively simple)
forward bias trading strategies. Notably, Galati and Melvin (2004) show that simple carry trades aimed at
exploiting the forward bias are one source of the surge in trading in the foreign exchange market observed in
recent years. In light of our conversations with foreign exchange chief dealers, these facts may be explained
by the fact that the decision to implement active currency strategies is, in practice, not predicated exclusively
on the assessment of the Sharpe ratio but also on the basis of the correlation of returns to the active hedge
with returns to the underlying portfolio, as well as the historical track record of active currency managers in
generating positive total returns. So the Sharpe ratio of, say, a forward bias strategy may not be appealing
over the long term, but if the return streams from the two strategies are uncorrelated, then the performance
of the portfolio is improved as a result and capital may be attracted by Sharpe ratios lower than the minimum
Sharpe ratios reported in Table 5. The relative performance of the two parts of the portfolio strategy may
be important in the determination of the relative risk budget that investors will allocate to each part (e.g.
21Cochrane (1999) shows how the unconditional Sharpe ratio is directly related to the adjusted R2 in the regression model
used.
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how much active currency management does a pension fund want on top of its equity portfolio). This
suggests further ways in which the approach taken in this paper could be improved in future research by
explicitly modelling returns in equity, bond and foreign exchange markets simultaneously while allowing a
role for limits to speculations and for cross correlation across returns.
5 Can We Match the Stylized Facts in Spot-Forward Regressions?
Some Monte Carlo Evidence
Given our discussion in Section 3 of the possibility of explaining the observed anomalies in spot-forward
regressions if in fact the true DGP driving deviations from UIP is nonlinear, it seems worthwhile investigating
whether we can match the stylized facts in spot-forward regressions using a DGP calibrated according to our
estimated nonlinear Fama models. This may help us understand why much previous research estimating
the linear Fama regression (2) has recorded a forward bias ( 6= 1) when in fact the forward bias may
characterize only economically small departures from UIP. This exercise may also shed some light on the
nding of excess returns predictability on the basis of the lagged forward premium, given that the regression
typically used by researchers (Equation (3)) is a reparameterization of the Fama regression (2).
5.1 Matching the Forward Bias
We executed a battery of Monte Carlo experiments based on an articial DGP identical to the estimated
nonlinear Fama regression (4), calibrated on the estimates reported in Table 4, with independent and identi-
cally distributed Gaussian innovations. Initializing the articial series at zero, we generated 5; 000 samples of
1; 040 observations and discarded the rst 100, leaving 5; 000 samples of 940 observations, matching exactly
the total number of actual observations used in this study. For the German mark and the euro we carried
out the simulations by generating 5; 000 samples of 778 and 309 observations and discarded the rst 100,
leaving 5; 000 samples of 678 and 209 observations respectively, again matching the number of observations
available for these exchange rates. The discarding of the rst 100 articial data is carried out to reduce the
impact of the DGP initialization. For each generated sample of observations we then estimated the standard
linear Fama regression (2). In Panel A of Table 8, we repeat in the rst two columns the estimates of  and
 obtained from the actual data (taken from Table 2), while in the third and fourth columns we report the
average of the 5; 000 estimates obtained from the estimation of the Fama regression on the articial data,
say MC and 
MC
, together with their 5th and 95th percentiles from the empirical distributions (reported
in parentheses).
The results of these Monte Carlo investigations reveal that, if the true DGP were indeed of the nonlinear
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form (4) and researchers estimated a linear Fama regression, the estimates of  and  recorded on average
would be very close to the ones estimated on actual data. In fact, the estimates of  and  recorded on
actual data are, for each exchange rate examined, in the interval between the 5th and 95th percentiles of
the empirical distribution of MC and MC obtained from estimating the Fama regression on the simulated
data. In the last two columns, we report the p-values from a formal test statistic of the null hypotheses that
MC =  and 
MC
=  respectively. The p-values are generally very high, indicating that the estimates
of  and  obtained from the actual data are indeed statistically insignicantly di¤erent from the average
estimates MC and 
MC
one would obtain from estimating the linear Fama regression using the articial
data we generated.
5.2 Matching the Predictive Power of the Forward Premium on Future Excess
Returns
We also investigated the ability of our nonlinear Fama regression to explain the puzzling nding that esti-
mation of regressions of the form (3) typically yield the result that the forward premium can predict future
excess returns. As argued in Section 2, since regression (3) is obtained from reparameterizing the Fama
regression (2), it is plausible that if nonlinearity in the true DGP of the spot-forward relationship can shed
light on the forward bias puzzle arising from Equation (2) it should also shed some light on the predictability
arising from Equation (3). Hence, using the same articial data described in the previous sub-section, we
estimated a regression of the form (3) for each of the 5; 000 generated samples. In Panel B of Table 8, we
report in the rst column the t-statistic for the signicance of the parameter associated with the forward
premium in regression (3), namely  (as given in Table 2), while in the second column we report the cor-
responding average of the 5; 000 t-statistics obtained from the estimation of regression (3) on the articial
data, say t( )MC , together with the 5th and 95th percentiles from its empirical distribution (reported in
parentheses).
The simulation results suggest that, if the true DGP were of the nonlinear form (4) (or its reparameterized
form (8)) and one estimated a predictability regression of the form (3), the t-statistics for the signicance
of  would be very close on average to the ones estimated on actual data, they would be statistically
signicant and would lie in the interval between the 5th and 95th percentiles of the empirical distribution
of t( )MC , for each exchange rate examined. On average, the t-statistics recorded are indeed statistically
signicantly di¤erent from zero. Finally, in the last column of Panel B, we report the p-value from a
formal test statistic for the null hypothesis that t( ) = t( )MC , termed t1. The p-value is generally
high, indicating that the t-statistic obtained from estimating Equation (3) on actual exchange rate data is
statistically insignicantly di¤erent from the average t-statistic (t( )MC) one would obtain from estimating
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the predictability regression (3) using the articial data we generated.
5.3 Summing up the Monte Carlo results
Overall, therefore, our Monte Carlo experiments suggest that if the true DGP governing the relationship
between the spot and forward exchange rates were of the nonlinear form we consider in this paper, estimation
of the Fama regression (2) and the predictability regression (3) would lead us to reject UIP, to record a
forward bias ( di¤erent from unity and generally negative), and to nd evidence of predictability of excess
returns using the information in the lagged forward premium, with estimates which are very close to the ones
observed in actual data. However, these three featuresviolation of UIP, forward bias, and predictability of
excess returnsare features which the DGP we study has only in the lower regime, which is a regime where
expected excess returns (deviations from UIP) are tiny enough to be economically unimportant and unlikely
to attract speculative capital.
6 Conclusions
Our empirical results provide conrmation that major bilateral dollar exchange rates are linked nonlinearly
to forward premia in the context of a model for UIP deviations which allows for time-variation in the forward
bias and nonlinear mean reversion towards UIP. The nonlinearities we uncover are consistent with a model of
deviations from UIP with two extreme regimes: a lower regime with persistent but tiny deviations from UIP,
and an upper regime where UIP holds. In some sense, this characterization of UIP deviations suggests that,
while UIP does not hold most of the time, deviations from UIP are generally economically small but they may
be persistent as long as expected foreign exchange excess returns are not large enough to attract speculative
capital. This evidence is consistent with recent theoretical contributions on the nature of exchange rate
dynamics in the presence of limits to speculation in the foreign exchange market.
In a number of Monte Carlo experiments calibrated on the estimated nonlinear models, we show that
if the true data generating process of UIP deviations were of the nonlinear form we consider, estimation of
conventional spot-forward regressions would generate the well known forward bias puzzle and the kind of
predictability of foreign exchange excess returns documented in the literature.
Our results therefore allow us to end this study by making three statements, albeit with some degree of
caution. First, the statistical rejection of UIP recorded by the literature may be less indicative of major
ine¢ ciencies in the foreign exchange market than has often been thought. Second, the forward bias puzzle
may be explained by the assumption of linearity which is standard in the relevant literature. In our tted
nonlinear models, the forward bias is more persistent the closer expected exchange rates are to the UIP
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equilibrium. Somewhat paradoxically, therefore, rejections of UIP in a linear context may indicate that
exchange rates have on average been relatively close to the UIP equilibrium, rather than implying that
UIP does not hold at all. Third, the limits to speculation hypothesis and the implied nonlinearities in the
relationship between spot and forward exchange rates appear to be of some importance in understanding
the properties of departures from the foreign exchange market e¢ ciency condition.
Although the results have been shown to be robust to a number of relevant tests, several caveats are in
order. While our empirical analysis is inspired by the limits to speculation hypothesis, we do not claim that
this paper provides a direct test of this specic hypothesis, but rather a test of its general predictions for
the relationship between spot and forward exchange rates. Our approach is best interpreted as an empirical
characterization of the spot-forward relationship motivated by the limits to speculation hypothesis or simply
as an empirical investigation of parsimonious models of foreign exchange excess returns. In particular,
although we have focused on a specic nonlinear formulation of the relationship between exchange rates and
forward premia capable of capturing some of the key predictions of the limits to speculation hypothesis,
experimentation with alternative nonlinear characterizations of the relationship is on the agenda for future
research both to assess the robustness of our results and to further tighten the link between theory and
empirical testing in a way that can allow us to discriminate among di¤erent arguments capable of rationalizing
the existence of nonlinearities. Experimentation with multivariate versions of the nonlinear models used here
that allow estimation of a general nonlinear error-correction model linking the dynamics of spot exchange
rates and the full term structure of forward exchange rates, in the spirit of Clarida et al. (2003), is also
a promising area of research. This development is likely to enhance the predictive power of our nonlinear
model, which, given its simplicity, might ignore important information. However, vector smooth-transition
error correction models of this kind are well known to present great di¢ culties in terms of estimation and
often trade o¤ the increased explanatory power with a decrease in the interpretability of estimation outcomes
(e.g. Granger and Teräsvirta, 1993). Further, while our results shed some light on why researchers have
typically recorded rejections of UIP and why the forward bias may persist, our framework does not explain
why  is negative in the lower regime rather than being, for example, in the middle of the inaction range.
Explaining this nding may require further theoretical models where trading activities that move exchange
rates are not driven just by pure currency strategies, as it is implicitly assumed under UIP (Lyons, 2001,
p. 216-8). Finally, our analysis has been conned to a single-currency setting, given our intention to shed
light on the forward bias and foreign exchange excess returns predictability anomalies, which have generally
indeed virtually exclusivelybeen studied in a single-exchange-rate setting. However, future research may
extend our framework to more complex multiple-exchange-rates strategies.
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A Appendix: Derivation of Equation (13)
Having re-written our modelling framework in the form (12), we are able to provide the solution in Equa-
tion (13) by following the same steps used by Peel and Venetis (2005) in the context of an autoregres-
sive exponential smooth transition process. Specically, recall that the Lambert W function has the
property W (x)eW (x) = x. This implies that xex = a has a solution x = W (a). Let ERmt =  and
' =

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 
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
. Then,  = e 
2
' () e2 = '. Squaring both sides and multiplying by
2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
2
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B Appendix: Robustness Results
Table B1. Nonlinear Forward Premium Regressions: ESTR estimation results
Panel A. Robustness to the forward contract maturity: 3-month forward rates (weekly data)
1 =  2 SE1= 2 1 = 1  2 SE1=1 2  SE
Japan 0.0090 (0.0028) -1.0557 (0.3390) 0.4668 (0.0593) [0.0032]
UK -0.0017 (0.0017) -0.8365 (0.3537) 0.2930 (0.0196) [0.0410]
Germany 0.0043 (0.0023) 0.5062 (0.2407) 0.6483 (0.1364) [0.0038]
Euro -0.0008 (0.0002) -1.3739 (0.6188) 0.0884 (0.0152) [0.1106]
Switzerland 0.0060 (0.0027) -0.9255 (0.3698) 0.4907 (0.0579) [0.0001]
Panel B. Robustness to the frequency of the data: monthly data (1-month forward rates)
1 =  2 SE1= 2 1 = 1  2 SE1=1 2  SE
Japan 0.0012 (0.0008) -2.4755 (0.9766) 0.7465 (0.2841) [0.0021]
UK -0.0026 (0.0028) -2.8954 (1.1746) 0.3391 (0.0756) [0]
Germany 0.0018 (0.0043) 0.0330 (0.7126) 1.7824 (0.7556) [0.0002]
Euro 0.0005 (0.0041) -3.8552 (1.5574) 0.0889 (0.0120) [0.0306]
Switzerland 0.0069 (0.0034) -2.1883 (1.0222) 0.2529 (0.1131) [0.0464]
Notes: Panel A. The table reports the results from estimating the nonlinear forward premium regres-
sion 3st+3 =

1 + 1
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  ERet 2io, using weekly data. Panel B. The table reports the results from esti-
mating the nonlinear forward premium regressionst+1 =
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  ERet 2io using monthly data. Note
that ER
e
t is dened as the expectation, formed at time t, of UIP deviations at time t+ 3. For both Panels
A and B, values in parentheses (SEx) are asymptotic standard errors for the parameter x, calculated using
an autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity consistent matrix of residuals (Newey and West, 1987); values in
brackets are p-values for the null hypothesis that  = 0 calculated by parametric bootstrap as in Skalin
(1998), using 5,000 replications. 0 denotes p-values lower than 10 5.
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Table B2. Empirical Size and Power Properties of the Linearity Tests
Panel A. Empirical size Panel B. Empirical power
10% 5% 1%
T=470
FL 0.0942 0.0434 0.0106
F3 0.0908 0.0462 0.0098
F2 0.0996 0.0480 0.0094
F1 0.0976 0.0480 0.0108
T=940
FL 0.0926 0.0438 0.0080
F3 0.0940 0.0464 0.0070
F2 0.0942 0.0460 0.0092
F1 0.0916 0.0464 0.0092
10% 5% 1%
T=470
FL 0.7492 0.6656 0.4944
F3 0.3136 0.2294 0.1194
F2 0.5824 0.4728 0.2906
F1 0.2384 0.1562 0.0694
T=940
FL 0.8000 0.7286 0.5810
F3 0.2818 0.1998 0.0914
F2 0.5986 0.4892 0.3102
F1 0.2238 0.1482 0.0586
Note: Panel A. The table reports the results of a Monte Carlo experiment where the null hypothesis of
linearity is true (i.e. the true DGP is the standard forward premium regression (2)) and it has been calibrated
on the parameters estimated for the Japanese yen reported in Table 2. Figures are probabilities of rejection
for di¤erent signicance levels (i.e. 10%, 5%,and 1%) and di¤erent sample sizes T = 470; 940. Panel B.
The table reports the results of a Monte Carlo experiment where the null hypothesis of linearity is false and
the true DGP is the nonlinear forward premium regression (4) calibrated on the parameters estimated for
the Japanese yen reported in Table 4. Figures are probabilities of rejection for di¤erent signicance levels
(i.e. 10%, 5%,and 1%) and di¤erent sample sizes T = 470; 940. For both Panels A and B, probabilities are
constructed using 5; 000 replications in each experiment with identical random numbers across experiments.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
Panel A. Forward premium, f1t   st
mean standard deviation AR(1)
Japan 0.0024 (0.0003) 0.0036 (0.0011) 0.614 (0.094)
UK -0.0022 (0.0003) 0.0031 (0.0013) 0.761 (0.057)
Germany 0.0004 (0.0005) 0.0040 (0.0014) 0.439 (0.059)
Euro 0.0004 (0.0005) 0.0021 (0.0008) 0.602 (0.079)
Switzerland 0.0014 (0.0003) 0.0031 (0.0009) 0.724 (0.055)
Panel B. Depreciation rate, st+1   st
mean standard deviation AR(1)
Japan 0.0008 (0.0006) 0.0159 (0.0049) 0.077 (0.030)
UK 0.0003 (0.0004) 0.0145 (0.0054) 0.025 (0.033)
Germany 0.0008 (0.0006) 0.0154 (0.0045) 0.053 (0.031)
Euro -0.0005 (0.0010) 0.0135 (0.0047) 0.090 (0.054)
Switzerland 0.0007 (0.0005) 0.0164 (0.0045) 0.048 (0.028)
Panel C. Return from currency speculation (excess return), st+1   f1t
mean standard deviation AR(1)
Japan 0.0002 (0.0007) 0.0159 (0.0049) 0.117 (0.028)
UK -0.0025 (0.0061) 0.0151 (0.0051) 0.057 (0.031)
Germany -0.0001 (0.0007) 0.0152 (0.0045) 0.053 (0.033)
Euro 0.0010 (0.0014) 0.0139 (0.0048) 0.131 (0.053)
Switzerland 0.0007 (0.0007) 0.0168 (0.0045) 0.085 (0.026)
Notes: One-month log-forward and log-spot exchange rates, f1t and st, are expressed as dollars per unit
of foreign currency. Data are Tuesdays of every week, taken from Datastream. The sample period spans
from 4 January 1985 to 31 December 2002 for all exchange rates except for the German mark (7 January
1986 to 31 December 1998) and the euro (5 January 1999 to 31 December 2002). Figures in parentheses are
standard errors calculated by using an autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity consistent matrix of residuals,
with three lags (Newey and West, 1987).
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Table 2. Forward Premium (Fama) Regressions
 SE()  SE() s.e. T
Japan 0.0015 (0.0005) -0.2865 (0.1586) 0.015 939
UK -0.0003 (0.0004) -0.3098 (0.2588) 0.014 939
Germany 0.0004 (0.0006) 0.3212 (0.1495) 0.015 677
Euro -0.0001 (0.0008) -0.8883 (0.4422) 0.013 208
Switzerland 0.0012 (0.0006) -0.3786 (0.1645) 0.016 939
t ( )
-6.742
-6.075
-4.712
-3.963
-7.036
Notes: The table shows the results from estimating, by ordinary least squares, the conventional forward
premium (Fama) regression (2): st+1 = + 
 
f1t   st

+ t+1. Values in parentheses (SE() and SE())
are asymptotic standard errors calculated using an autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity consistent matrix
of residuals (Newey and West, 1987). s.e. is the standard deviation of the residual t+1; and T is the
number of usable observations. The last column reports the t-statistic (namely t( )) for the parameter
 in regression (3): ERt+1 = + 

 
f1t   st

+ t+1, where ERt+1  st+1  
 
f1t   st
  st+1   f1t , and
 =    1.
Table 3. Linearity Tests on the Fama Regression
FL F3 F2 F1
Japan 0.020 0.077 0.006 0.142
UK 5.2910 16 0.219 0.038 0.365
Germany 3.1010 17 0.087 0.044 0.061
Euro 5.0910 5 0.268 0.027 0.224
Switzerland 0.011 0.983 0.001 0.546
Notes: The table reports the p-values from applying the linearity testing procedure suggested by
Teräsvirta (1994, 1998). Assuming that a plausible, generic transition variable is qt, the appropriate auxiliary
regression for the linearity tests against a STR alternative is the following: bet+1 = #00At+1 + #01At+1 (qt) +
#02At+1 (qt)
2
+#03At+1 (qt)
3
+ innovations, where bet+1 is the estimated disturbance retrieved from the linear
model being tested for linearity (in the present context it is the residual from each of the Fama regression
models reported in Table 2), and At denotes the vector of explanatory variables in the model being tested,
which in our case simply amounts to the lagged forward premium. The transition variable, qt used in our
tests is the expected excess return for one month ahead based on information at time t, ER
e
t . The general
test for linearity against STR is then the ordinary F -test of the null hypothesis: H0L : #
0
1 = #
0
2 = #
0
3 = 0.
The choice between a LSTR and an ESTR model is based on a sequence of nested tests within H0L. First,
the null hypothesisH0L must be rejected using an ordinary F -test (FL). Then the following three hypotheses
are tested sequentially: H03 : #
0
3 = 0; H02 : #
0
2 j #03 = 0; H01 : #01 j #02 = #03 = 0. Again, an F -test is used,
with the corresponding test statistics denoted F3, F2, and F1, respectively. The decision rule is as follows:
if the test of H02 has the smallest p-value, an ESTR is chosen, otherwise an LSTR is selected. The p-values
were calculated using the appropriate F distribution.
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Table 4. Nonlinear Fama Regressions: ESTR Estimation Results
Panel A. Parameter estimates
1 =  2 SE1= 2 1 = 1  2 SE1=1 2  SE
Japan 0.0018 (0.0008) -0.5719 (0.2278) 0.4014 (0.0501) [0.0010]
UK -0.0004 (0.0005) -0.4708 (0.1557) 0.1209 (0.0061) [0.0480]
Germany 0.0008 (0.0008) 0.1540 (0.0633) 0.5348 (0.1522) [0.0048]
Euro -0.0003 (0.0010) -1.0608 (0.5844) 0.1148 (0.0188) [0]
Switzerland 0.0018 (0.0009) -1.0072 (0.3254) 0.5130 (0.0583) [0]
Panel B. Diagnostic tests
LR1 LR2 FNRN FNSB
Japan 0.115 0.901 0.903 0.547
UK 0.341 0.914 0.969 0.495
Germany 0.713 0.937 0.940 0.466
Euro 0.134 0.897 0.998 0.502
Switzerland 0.304 0.449 0.994 0.593
Notes: Panel A. The table shows the results from the nonlinear forward premium regression st+1 =
1 + 1
 
f1t   st

+

2 + 2
 
f1t   st

G

ER
e
t ; 

+"t+1, where 2 =  1, 2 = 1 1 and G

ER
e
t ; 

=n
1  exp
h
   ERet 2 =b2EReio. Values in parentheses (SEx) are asymptotic standard errors for the para-
meter x, calculated using an autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity consistent matrix of residuals (Newey
and West, 1987). Values in brackets are p-values for the null hypothesis that  = 0, calculated by the
parametric bootstrap procedure suggested by Skalin (1998) using 5; 000 replications. 0 denotes p-values
lower than 10 5. Panel B. LR1 is the likelihood ratio test for the joint null hypothesis that +1 = 
 
1
and +2 = 
 
2 from the unrestricted nonlinear model: st+1 =
h
1 + 
+
1
 
f1t   st
+
+  1
 
f1t   st
 i
+h
2 + 
+
2
 
f1t   st
+
+  2
 
f1t   st
 i
G

ER
e
t ; 

+ "t+1, where
 
f1t   st
+
and
 
f1t   st
 
are forward pre-
mia (f1t   st > 0) and forward discounts (f1t   st < 0) respectively. LR2 is the likelihood ratio test for
the null hypothesis that 2 =  1, 2 = 1  1. FNRN is the test for the null hypothesis of no remaining
nonlinearity, constructed as in Eitrheim and Teräsvirta (1996). FNSB is a test for the null hypothesis of no
structural break in the models parameters, constructed as in Eithreim and Teräsvirtas (1996). For all test
statistics, we report p-values, calculated using an autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity consistent matrix
of residuals.
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Table 5. Sharpe Ratios
SR min SR %Obs SR  min SR
Japan 0.14 1.32 82
UK 0.88 2.40 97
Germany 0.41 1.14 68
Euro 0.72 2.46 97
Switzerland 0.25 1.17 83
Average 0.48 1.69 83
Notes: The rst column of the table reports the mean of the annualized Sharpe ratio (SR) implied by
our weekly data. SR is calculated as the realized average excess returns (E [st+1   (ft   st)] = E [ER])
divided by the standard deviations of excess returns (ER) over the sample period on an annual basis:
E[ER]
ER
 p52. min SR (second column) is the minimum value of the annualized Sharpe ratio which leads
to a shift from the lower regime to the upper regime, dened here as the value of the transition function
 ()  1  exp  SR2	 = 0:5. The last column reports the percentage of observations where the
annualized Sharpe ratio is lower than or equal to the minimum Sharpe ratio, as given by min SR. The last
row reports averages across countries for each column.
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Table 6. Forecast Comparisons
Linear Fama Nonlinear Fama
Japan 0.002 (0:001) 0.009* (0:004)
UK 0.002 (0:002) 0.012 (0:011)
Germany 0.007* (0:003) 0.009* (0:004)
Euro 0.016 (0:010) 0.027 (0:015)
Switzerland 0.003 (0:002) 0.025* (0:010)
Notes: Figures reported denote estimates of the parameter  in the equation dst+1jt = 0 + st+1 +
t+1, where the hat denotes the one-step-ahead (one-week-ahead) prediction from the (linear or nonlinear)
Fama regression; see Evans and Lyons (2005). Figures in parentheses are standard errors calculated using
the Newey-West autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity consistent covariance correction with three lags.
The asterisk denotes estimates of  that are statistically signicantly di¤erent from zero at the ve percent
signicance level.
Table 7. Unconditional Sharpe Ratios
Linear Fama Nonlinear Fama
R
2
SR R
2
SR
Japan 0.040 0.465 0.108 0.548
UK 0.002 0.403 0.078 0.508
Germany 0.031 0.445 0.037 0.453
Euro 0.070 0.498 0.108 0.548
Switzerland 0.050 0.470 0.169 0.629
Notes: The table reports unconditional annualized Sharpe ratios corresponding to each R
2
for both
the linear and nonlinear Fama regression. The formula applied to compute the annualized Sharpe ratios is:
SR =
q
0:42 +R
2
=
q
1 R2, as in Cochrane (1999, pp. 65-66, pp. 75-76). The value chosen to proxy for
the unconditional annualized Sharpe ratio of a US buy-and-hold strategy is 0.4 (rst term in the square root
on the numerator), as reported in the main text and consistent with Sharpe (1994) and Lyons (2001).
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Table 8. Monte Carlo Results: Matching the Stylized Facts
Panel A. Matching the forward bias puzzle
  MC 
MC
t () t ()
Japan 0.0015 -0.2865 0.0013 (0.0002,0.0025) -0.1588 (-0.4737,0.1492) 0.848 0.501
UK -0.0003 -0.3098 -0.0003 (-0.0014,0.0007) -0.3094 (-0.6607,0.0429) 0.979 0.999
Germany 0.0004 0.3212 0.0005 (-0.0003,0.0015) 0.4141 (0.1718,0.6508) 0.783 0.522
Euro -0.0001 -0.8883 -0.0002 (-0.0018,0.0012) -0.8502 (-1.638,-0.0807) 0.881 0.936
Switzerland 0.0012 -0.3786 0.0012 (0.0002,0.0022) -0.3674 (-0.6955,-0.042) 0.966 0.955
Panel B. Matching the predictive power of the forward premium on future excess returns
t ( ) t ( )
MC
t1
Japan -6.742 -6.147 (-4.382,-8.044) 0.592
UK -6.075 -6.166 (-4.373,-8.040) 0.935
Germany -4.712 -4.088 (-2.396,-5.857) 0.558
Euro -3.963 -4.046 (-2.206,-6.022) 0.943
Switzerland -7.036 -6.947 (-5.096,-8,896) 0.939
Notes: Panel A. ;  are the estimates of the standard Fama regression (2), taken from Table 2.
MC ; 
MC
denote the average of the empirical distribution (based on 5; 000 replications) of the coe¢ cients
;  obtained from estimating the standard forward premium regression (2) using articial data under a true
DGP which is a nonlinear forward premium regression of the form (4), using 5; 000 replications. Values
in parentheses are the 5th and 95th percentiles of the empirical distribution of the parameters MC ; MC
respectively. t() and t() are the p-values of the test statistic for the null hypothesis that MC =  and

MC
= , respectively. Panel B. t( ) is the estimated t-statistic for the signicance of  in the regression
of excess returns on the lagged forward premium, dened in Equation (3). t( )MC is the average of the
empirical distribution of the t-statistic for the signicance of the parameter  on forward premium in a
predictive regression of the form ERt+1 = +

 
f1t   st

+error, calculated under the same DGP as above
using 5,000 replications. Values in parentheses correspond to the 5th and 95th percentiles of the empirical
distribution of the test statistics t( ). t1 is the p-value of the test statistic for the null hypothesis that
t( )MC = t( ).
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Figure 1.  Estimated transition functions and Sharpe ratios
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Figure 2.  Sharpe ratios and estimated transition functions
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